The 19th German Army
Despite the obvious strategic significance of the Mediterranean ports and despite reliable intelligence that very strongly suggested a second French invasion was in the works, the Southern France area was deemed to be a second-tier theater of operations. On the Atlantic Front, advances made by the Allied armies had done much to tie up the limited amount of military resources that Nazi Germany could muster. There was just way too much territory, and not enough military men and equipment to effectively defend all of it. As a result the German Army Group G, under Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz did not receive nearly enough resources it would need to stave off an invasion of a determined enemy coming from the South.
Johannes Blaskowitz
There was but meager tank support available to counter an invasion in the Dragoon area of operations aside from a scattering of units. The feared 11th Panzer Division was stationed in Bordeaux to fight a phantom invasion that would never arrive (this misdirection was courtesy of a British counter-intelligence effort dubbed "Operation Ironside"). Luftwaffe air power was at this point negligible in the region, although aerial reconnaissance had given German command a very clear indications as to the intent of the Allies: Invasion forces could be seen mustering and training in the area of Italy, but exactly where the Allied Forces intended to land and when it would happen was still in doubt. German naval support was also considered to be of no consequence, the closest destroyer was in the waters off Genoa, and there were only seven subs, five torpedo boats, seven escort ships, and assorted smaller boats in the vicinity of the Dragoon area that could wage a battle. Such a force was meaningless against a target group the size of the Seventh Army invasion force. The remaining ground units in the Frejus/Saint Raphael area were largely made up of soldiers from LXII Corps comprised of the the 242nd and 148th Infantry Divisions commanded by Lieutenant General Ferdinand Neuling. The troops of LXII Corps gained about half their strength from the "Ostlegionen", conscripts from Poland and Russia who were pressed into service by their conquerors. The rest of the troops were young and fairly well trained, but untested in combat. These troops did have very experienced officers and NCOs commanding them, making a huge difference upon their combat performance, but were not given top-rate equipment, and were sorely lacking in mechanized mobility.
Defending Cote d'Azur
Freiderich Wiese
Infantry General Freiderich Weise, commanding the 19th Army (directly subordinate to Army Group G) also knew that he couldn't wage an offense when the bulk of his troops were of questionable loyalty and experience. Even a solid defense of his territory was in doubt when lacking any kind of immediate armor of air support. Acting on direct orders from General Erwin Rommel himself, Weise and Blaskowitz made preparations to maximize the defenses of the “Sudwall” to address these shortcomings. Starting in May of 1944, Blaskowitz leveraged 14,000+ conscripted French laborers and the Wehrmacht’s own military engineering branch (the "Todt Organization") to fortify the area with an impressive array of hardened defensive emplacements. On the coastline, and in the ports themselves, disguised cannon emplacements were set up that could duel with any landing ships attempting to come aground. Artillery batteries capable of raining high-explosive shells upon the beaches themselves were strategically deployed in the hills overlooking these port towns, and pre-zeroed on likely avenues of approach. Hundreds upon hundreds of concrete bunkers laced with barbed wire were seeded throughout the area. Typically manned by machine-gun squads and infantry troops backed by mortar teams, even one of these emplacements could bring an advance of unarmored troops to a grinding halt.
Tank turret emplacement at St Raphael
To resist a landing, nets of anti-ship mines were strewn in the waters (especially Camel Red Beach), and even more were placed on the underwater obstructions blanketing the shoreline. Additional pillboxes and trench networks were constructed to provide defilade for machinegun teams and infantry safeguarding the beaches. Weise also had older-model tank turrets removed, and buried in hardened bunkers right on the shoreline to maximize his available resources for an effective defense. Anti-Tank gun ambush spots were set up on the avenues of approach to the key cities in the Camel Force zone, and infantry was heavily dispersed throughout the area. Copious roadblocks were constructed, made up of high concrete walls and "Dragons Teeth" to block vehicle passage and better channel invading forces through heavily defended areas. Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines were amply strewn within the city, and along the railways and roads leading into it. Local residences within the outlying areas of Saint Raphael and Frejus were fortified into camouflaged networks of strong points where infantry and machine-gun teams could ambush those who would wander into their midst. The German Army also had a bountiful supply of Goliath tanks (wire-guided bombs on small treads designed to be driven underneath a tank and then detonated) to ambush mechanized columns.
The map below shows some of the real-world locations for the German Army defenses facing the 143rd Infantry Regiment on the day of the invasion. This map is certainly not all-inclusive in terms of detailing all defensive positions held by the German Army, nor does it do justice to illustrating how dangerously infested the area was with mines, booby-traps, and hidden strong points teeming with infantry defenders that don't show up on aerial recon photos. These enemy positions were mostly made available to the Seventh Army through aerial reconnaissance, and intelligence provided by the French Maquis resistance fighters.
Map of Enemy Defenses
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